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IN RE JENSEN: DETERMINING WHEN A 
BANKRUPTCY CLAIM ARISES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Jensen,! the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit (Appellate Panel) held the State of California's 
claim against a bankrupt corporation for hazardous waste 
cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)2 and the 
Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSA)3 arose prior to the 
time when the bankruptcy petition was filed.· Thus, the State's 
1. In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (per Ashland, J.; the other panel 
members were Meyers, J., and Ollason, J.). 
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)). This is the federal 
"Superfund" statute which provides agencies with a procedure for cleanup cost recovery 
from those parties responsible for hazardous waste contamination. 
3. Hazardous Substance Account Act (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1992)). Also known as the "State Superfund," this 
statute provides state agencies ~ith a procedure for cleanup cost recovery from those 
parties responsible for hazardous waste contamination. 
4. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32. The Appellate Panel followed the district court's holding 
in In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd sub nom., United 
States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), that a bank-
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claim was discharged pursuant to section 727 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act (Bankruptcy Code).11 The court reasoned that the 
debtor's conduct, here the discharge of hazardous wastes, dic-
tated when the State's claim arose.s 
II. FACTS 
The Jensens wholly-owned and operated Jensen Lumber 
Company (JLC), a lumber treatment facility, which dipped logs 
in fungicide tanks. 7 On February 2, 1984, the Jensens received a 
letter from the California Regional Water Quality Control Board 
stating that a hazardous waste problem existed at the site.8 The 
Jensens subsequently filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code on February 13, 1984.9 
threatened release of hazardous waste, and was, therefore, dischargeable in this case. The 
court reasoned this result sustains the fresh start goal of bankruptcy and discourages 
manipulation of the bankruptcy process. Id. at 33. 
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 
(1988». Section 727 lists the circumstances when a court can grant an individual debtor 
a discharge from creditors' claims. 
6. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32' (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 522 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990», aff'd sub nom., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
7. In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 28 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). The lumber was treated by 
dipping the logs into a fungicide solution containing pentachlorophenol. In re Jensen, 
114 B.R. 700, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990). The fungicide solution was held in an 
aboveground, six foot by six foot by twenty foot, cinder block tank. Id. 
8. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 28. 
9. Id. The following is a partial excerpt of the appendix to the appellate decision 
which contained a chronology of events. 
12/2/83 - JLC filed voluntary petition under Chapter 11. 
1/25/84 - Albert Wellman, engineer for the Board, inspected the JLC site. 
2/2/84 - The Jensens received a letter from Wellman stating a potential hazardous waste 
problem existed at the site. 
2/10/84 - The Jensens' attorney informed Wellman by letter that JLC had filed a Chap-
ter 11 petition, virtually certain to be converted to Chapter 7, and that JLC had no 
available funds for site cleanup. 
2/13/84 - The Jensens filed a joint voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7. 
The schedule of liabilities filed did not include any costs for potential site cleanup. 
2/24/84 - First notice of creditors' meeting in the Jensens' individual bankruptcy. 
3/84 - The Board requested assistance from the Department of Health Services. 
3/20/84 - JLC's Chapter 11 case converted to Chapter 7. 
7/16/84 - The Jensens were released from all dischargeable debts in their personal Chap-
ter 7 case. 
2/20/85 - The Jensens' personal bankruptcy closed with no assets being distributed to 
creditors. 
3/18/87 - JLC Chapter 7 case was closed. 
Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33-34. 
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The California Department of Health Services (DHS) be-
came involved in March, 1984.10 After expending funds for haz-
ardous waste cleanup, DHS sought indemnification from the 
Jensens.ll 
Eventually, the Jensens filed an adversary proceeding to de-
termine whether the DHS claim was pre petition and therefore 
discharged.12 The bankruptcy court granted the DHS motion for 
summary judgment and denied the Jensen's motion for sum-
mary judgment.13 The Jensens appealed.14 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The court specifically limited its review to the issue of when 
DHS's claim arose for purposes of bankruptcy. III In addition, the 
court expressly stated that its decision did not address the issue 
of whether the environmental claim was exempted from 
discharge. 16 
A. BROAD INTERPRETATION OF 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) DEFINING 
CLAIM 
The court set the groundwork for its analysis by evaluating 
the scope of the definition of "claim."17 This analysis employed 
a broad interpretation of claim, defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4).18 
10. Id. at 28. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 28. 
14.Id. 
15. In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). 
16. Id. The court noted DHS did not contend that its claim was excepted from dis-
charge, rather the claim arose postpetition and was, therefore, not discharged. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988). Section 101(4) defines claim as follows: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquiaated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not 
such right to equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, se-
cured, or unsecured. 
Jensen, 127 B.R. at 29. 
3
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After the court determined that the use of a broad interpreta-
tion was the most appropriate,19 it was confronted with the addi-
tional issue of interpreting just how broad this definition should 
be.30 
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS 
The Ninth Circuit cited two recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions: Ohio v. Kovacs21 and Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,22 in-
volving environmental issues in the context of bankruptcy.23 In 
Kovacs the Court held that the State of Ohio's injunction to 
clean up hazardous waste was a claim and, therefore, dischargea-
ble in bankruptcy.24 In Midlantic National Bank, the Court 
held that state environmental laws could require a bankruptcy 
trustee to clean up the debtor's contaminated property/all How-
ever, neither Kovacs nor Midlantic National Bank were fol-
lowed because they failed to address when bankruptcy claims 
19. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 29. The Appellate Panel relied on congressional proceedings 
to support its use of this particular interpretation of claim. Congress commented: 
The effect of the definition is a significant departure from pre· 
sent law . . . . By this broadest possible definition and by use 
of the term throughout the. title 11 . . . the bill contemplates 
that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote 
or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy 
case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy 
court. 
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21·22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5807·08. 
20. Jensen, 127 S.R. at 29. 
21. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 276 (1985). In Ohio v. Kovacs, the State of Ohio 
filed an injunction requiring the debtor to clean up hazardous waste on the debtor's 
property. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the State sought a declaration that the 
debtor's obligation under the injunction was not dischargeable. Id. at 277. The State 
argued the injunction did not constitute a "debt" or "liability on a claim" as defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code and was thus not dischargeable. Id. The United States Supreme 
Court disagreed, finding the State wanted the equivalent of a monetary payment which 
was within the definition of a claim. Id. Consequently, the debtor's environmental obli· 
gation was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 282. 
22. Midlantic Nafl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 
(1986). The Court narrowed a bankruptcy trustee's powers in order to force a cleanup of 
hazardous waste. The Supreme Court determined that a trustee in bankruptcy could not 
abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation reasonably designed 
to protect public health and safety, such as state environmental laws. Id. at 506·07. 
23. Jensen, 127 S.R. at 29. 
24. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283. 
25. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507. 
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arose.26 
C. ORIGINATION OF CLAIMS 
Because the respective Supreme Court decisions offered no 
guidance, the court turned to other authority to determine when 
bankruptcy claims originated.27 This authority provided that 
bankruptcy claims may arise: (1) with the right to payment, (2) 
upon the establishment of the relationship between creditor and 
debtor, or (3) based upon the debtor's conduct.28 
1. Claim Arises With the Right to Payment 
The bankruptcy court held that the claim arose with the 
right to payment, that is, after cleanup costs were incurred.29 
The court's reasoning was as follows: section 101(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code specifically required a right to payment before a 
cognizable claim originated,30 and the right to payment under 
CERCLA or HSA did not arise until cleanup costs were in-
curred.31 Thus, the court concluded that until cleanup costs were 
incurred, no right to payment and no cognizable bankruptcy 
claim existed.32 
In In re Frenville,33 the Third Circuit adopted this theory. 
The Frenville court, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code· did 
not clearly define when a right to payment arose, applied state 
law.34 The appropriate state law declared a right to payment 
arose upon payment of the judgment flowing from the act.311 The 
Third Circuit concluded that the creditor's claim arose postpeti-




30. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 30. 
31. Id. 
32.Id. 
33. In re Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). 
A creditor appealed a district court order holding the creditor's indemnity action against 
the Chapter 7 debtor was barred by the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code .. Id. at 332. 
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tion and was not discharged by the debtor's bankruptcy.s6 
The Appellate Panel did not follow Frenville. S7 The court 
justified its departure by noting that Frenville had been criti-
cized for confusing a right to payment for federal bankruptcy 
purposes with the accrual of a cause of action for state law pur-
poses. S8 In addition, the court stated the definition of claim 
under section 101(4) included contingent and unmatured rights 
to payment. S9 
If a bankruptcy claim arose based on a statutory right to 
payment, the Appellate Panel believed the bankruptcy process 
would be manipulated.40 The court reasoned that utilizing a 
statutory right to payment to trigger recognition of a bank-
ruptcy claim would contravene the goal of the Bankruptcy Code 
to provide a "fresh start" for the debtor.41 
DHS argued that a private cause of action does not arise 
under CERCLA until cleanup costs are incurred.42 The bank-
ruptcy court and DHS cited Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Rich-
mond Terminal CO.4S and Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co."" in support of this proposition.411 However, the 
court's opinion discounted these cases as being inapposite and 
distinguishable.46 Similarly, the court concluded that In re Hem-
36.Id. 
37. Jensen, 127 B.H. at 31. 
38. Id. at 30 (citing In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.H. 986, 992 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986)). 
39. Jensen, 127 B.H. at 31. 
40. Id. The court postulated that a creditor, aware of a debtor's precarious financial 
situation, would delay expenditures in anticipation of the debtor's bankruptcy, thereby 
preventing discharge of the creditor's claims. Id. 
41. Id. The court justified this policy of providing a "fresh start" for the debtor by 
turning to a recent Supreme Court decision. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991). 
42. Jensen, 127 B.H. at 31. 
43. Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th 
Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit found that private causes of action under CERCLA did not 
arise until cleanup costs were incurred. 
44. Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1450-52 
(S.D. Fla. 1984). District court found that private causes of action under CERCLA did 
not arise until cleanup costs were incurred. 
45. Jensen, 127 B.H. at 31. 
46. Id. The court concluded reliance on these cases was misplaced because the cases 
did not involve bankruptcy or when a bankruptcy claim arose. Id. Rather, the cases only 
determined that a private action under CERCLA could not be commenced prior to in-
currence of cleanup costs. Id. 
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ingway Transport, Inc,''' and In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod-
ucts CO.,48 cases which held that cleanup costs were entitled to 
administrative expense priority, were inapplicable as well. The 
Appellate Panel concluded that the bankruptcy court's reliance 
on these cases was misplaced because neither case mentioned 
the definition of a claim under section 101(4) nor addressed 
when a bankruptcy claim arose.49 
2. Claim Arises Upon the Establishment of the Relationship 
Between the Debtor and the Creditor 
DHS alternatively contended that claims originate at the 
earliest point of a relationship between the debtor and the credi-
tor. IIO DHS asserted that because its staff did not become in-
volved until after the Jensens filed for individual bankruptcy, its 
claims would be postpetition and not dischargeable. III The court 
rejected this view and concluded the analysis used in Edge,1I2 
cited by DHS, actually followed the view that the claim arose 
47. In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 73 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Ma. 1987). In Heming-
way, the plaintiff purchased property from the bankruptcy trustee, property which later 
was found to be contaminated with hazardous waste. The plaintiff was forced to clean up 
the waste and sought indemnification from the estate, asserting administrative priority 
for its claim. Id. at 504. The court held plaintiff's claims were entitled to administrative 
priority because of the negligence of the trustee. Id. at 504-05. 
48. In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987). The Wall 
court held Tennessee's response costs, incurred at debtor's hazardous waste site, were 
allowable as administrative expenses. Id. at 124. 
49. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31. The court found Hemingway distinguishable because the 
case only dealt with administrative priority claims. Id. Furthermore, the court justified 
this distinction because the bankruptcy court's decision relied on equitable considera-
tions. Id. Specifically, the bankruptcy court frowned upon the debtor's attempt to trans-
fer its liability or potential liability under state or federal environmental laws. Heming-
way, 73 B.R. at 505. 
The Appellate Panel determined that Wall was also inapposite for failing to men-
tion section 101(4) or the origination of a bankruptcy claim. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31. 
50. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31. 
51. Id. 
52. In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986), involved the prepetition neg-
ligence of two debtor dentists. The plaintiff sought a declaration that her claim arose 
upon discovery of the injury, which was postpetition, and was, therefore, not subject to 
the automatic stay. Id. at 690. The bankruptcy court held the plaintiff's claim arose at 
the time the negligence occurred and allowed the plaintiff to share in the distribution of 
the debtors' prepetition assets. Id. at 699. 
However, the Appellate Panel construed the results of Edge differently than DHS. 
The court inferred the claim arose at the time of the dentists' negligent conduct, which 
coincided with the relationship between the debtor-dentists and creditor-plaintiff. Jen-
sen, 127 B.R. at 32. 
7
Eng: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
266 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:259 
based upon the debtor's conduct.1i3 
3. Claim Arises Based Upon the Debtor's Conduct 
The Appellate Panel adopted the theory that a bankruptcy 
claim originated with conduct, by the debtor, leading to a cause 
of action.1i4 The court discussed In re Johns-Manville Corp.1i1i 
and In re A.H. Robins CO.,1i6 cases frequently cited in support of 
this theory. 
One bankruptcy court has applied this theory to environ-
mental claims. The bankruptcy court, in In re Chateaugay Corp. 
(LTV),1i7 examined the language of CERCLA requiring a release 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance before liability 
can be established. The LTV court held so long as a prepetition 
triggering event has occurred, then the claim is dischargeable, 
regardless of when the claim for relief may be ripe for 
adjudication. liS 
The Appellate Panel adopted the reasoning applied in 
LTV.1i9 In doing so, the court rejected the DHS argument that 
LTV was distinguishable because the LTV parties had an exten-
sive relationship prior to the bankruptcy filing.60 The rationale 
for adopting this view was based upon the bankruptcy goal of 
providing a fresh start to the debtor and discouraging the ma-
53. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32. 
54.Id. 
55. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In In re Johns-
Manville, creditors sought relief from the stay so they could pursue the claims in state 
court. The bankruptcy court denied them relief because the court held that the claim 
arose at the time of sale of defective goods which occurred prepetition. Id. at 690. 
56. In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). In re A.H. Robins 
Co. involved a Dalkon Shield claimant who had been inserted with the shield prepetition 
but perceived no injury until postpetition. The A.H. Robins court rejected the reasoning 
in Frenville and found the definition of claim in Edge overly broad for purposes of 
achieving Bankruptcy Code goals. Id. at 993. Using the theory from Johns-Manville, 
that a claim arises at the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were 
performed, the A.H. Robins court held the claim arose at the time the shield was in-
serted. Id. 
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
58. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32 (citing In re Chateaugay, 112 B.R. 552). 
59. Id. at 33. 
60. Id. The court called DHS's argument unpersuasive and further stated it over-
looked the plain holding that a claim arose for purposes of discharge upon the actual or 
threatened release of hazardous waste by the debtor. Id. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/17
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 267 
nipulation of the bankruptcy process.61 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS MAY NOT CONTROL 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT 
The court refused to consider the bankruptcy court's and 
DHS's contention that environmental cleanup claims deserved 
higher priority in bankruptcy proceedings because of public pol-
icy considerations.62 The Appellate Panel noted, "[c]ourts are 
not free to formulate their own rules of super or sub-priorities 
within a specifically enumerated class."63 The court maintained 
that preference to particular claims would only be accorded in 
the presence of clear legislative intent.s. 
o 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In In re Jensen,6/) the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit held the State of California's claim against a 
bankrupt corporation for hazardous waste cleanup costs under 
CERCLA and the HSA arose prior to the time when the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed. Thus, the State's claim was discharged 
pursuant to section 727 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.66 The 
Appellate Panel concluded that hazardous waste cleanup claims 
arose when conduct causing contamination first occurred.67 
Consequently, environmental cleanup claims would almost 
always arise prepetition, for bankruptcy purposes, and generally 
would be dischargeable. As a practical matter, the court's hold-
61. Id. 
62. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33. 
63. Id. (citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988)). Dant in-
volved whether private claims against the debtor under CERCLA would be given admin-
istrative expense priority. Dant, 853 F.2d at 700. The Ninth Circuit established a policy 
against giving preference to particular claims. Id. at 709. Even though Dant did not ad-
dress the timing of a claim, the Appellate Panel noted the Dant court discouraged giving 
preference to particular claims. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33. 
64. Id. The Dant court expressed its objection to preferential treatment holding 
that "[a]lthough [the creditor] asserts that public policy considerations entitle its claims 
for cleanup costs to administrative expense priority, we acknowledge that Congress alone 
fixes priorities." Dant, 853 F.2d at 709. 
65. In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). 
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ing may insulate debtor's responsible for hazardous waste con-
tamination from CERCLA liability. 
Myron A. Eng* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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